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ANTITRUST IN JAPAN. By: Eleanor M. Hadley. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970. Pp 453, Appendices, Index. 
$18.50. Eleanor M. Hadley is an economist with the U.S. Tariff 
Commission. 
Antitrust in Japan is a statistically annotated examination of the 
economic consequences of the post-World War II American trustbreak-
ing experiment in Japan and an attack on the family controlled 
conglomerates, the Zaibatsu. Professor Hadley has conveniently broken 
the text into two parts. Part I is an analysis of occupation efforts 
towards breaking up Japanese concentrated business interests. It is 
based on Professor T. A. Bisson's original study, "Zaibatsu Dissolution 
in Japan."1 with updated differences in interpretation and analysis. 
Part II is an historical analysis of Japan with statistical supplementation 
as current as 1964. The economist and statistician interested in Japan 
will undoubtedly devour this work, as Part I's 204 pages have 44 
devoted in part or in full to statistical supplementation in table form; 
109 of the 249 pages in Part II are consumed in the same manner. 
Unfortunately, those searching for legal topics may skim through much 
of the text. 
In the legal realm, Part I deals partially with the U. S. inspired 
Deconcentration and Antimonopoly Laws. The Deconcentration Law, 
or Public Law No. 207, was very similar in structure to German 
legislation of the same period, also U. S. inspired and aimed at 
deconcentration efforts in Germany. The broad intention of this law 
was to establish a reasonable basis for competition and freedom of 
enterprise through the elimination of economic power concentrations 
which stifled efficiency as well as freedom. The Deconcentration Law 
explicitly recognized conglomerate operations as leading to excessive 
concentrations of economic power. Since such concentrations tend to 
remove the individual as an input to a democratic system, this move 
was felt to be highly necessary. 
While the Deconcentration Law and Antimonopoly Law were 
supposed to accomplish the same ends, most people found the 
Antimonopoly Law a more acceptable piece of legislation as it involved 
no purges of high company officials. The objectives of the law were 
basically: to make illegal all unreasonable restraints on business; to 
outlaw all price and quantity fixing; to outlaw cartels; to place 
restraints on interlocking directorates; and to outlaw holding companies 
as the key corporate device for creating combines. 
With the coming of the Cold War, and the takeover of China by the 
Communist Party in 1949, U.S.-Japanese policy changed drastically. 
1 T. A. BISSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN (1954). 
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The U. S. felt it wiser to have an economically strong Japan as an ally in 
the Far East. Therefore, many industries were exempted by the 
Antimonopoly Law. As a result, what little the Antimonopoly program 
had accomplished was quickly undone. 
Part II, a study of the consequences of Part I, constitutes about 
three-fifths of the work. Of particular interest is the chapter on cartels. 
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3rd Edition) defines a cartel as "an 
association of industrialists or financiers for a purpose, usually secret, 
and sometimes ulterior, such as fixing prices, creating a monopoly, or 
cornering the market." When dealing with Japanese cartels, however, 
the words "usually secret and sometimes ulterior" are not applicable as 
cartels are a way of life for Japanese big business. On the other hand, 
the words "cornering the market," or "dividing it," are to be stressed. 
It is the thinking of most Japanese officials, both governmental and 
private, that competitive policy is inefficient; competition is always 
excessive competition. Competition is not regarded as conducive to 
technological progress. Of course, this ideology does not prohibit 
internal competition as between engineers in one company for a better 
product; it deals with the duplication of basic materials necessary to a 
trade or business. Why have two auto manufacturers working twelve 
hour days when the same job can be done by one company working a 
twenty-four hour day - thus saving the cost required for a second 
plant? If a small country is to become an economic giant in high 
technology products there can be no waste. In practice, however, the 
number of different Japanese transistor radios on the market shows 
some flaws in the theory, due undoubtedly to the variety demand by 
the consumer in the world market. 
The U. S., Europe, and Japan all have different feelings about cartels. 
America condemns them, Europe distinguishes between good and bad 
(when possible), and the Japanese favor them. It should be noted that 
even in pre-war Japan the legal concept of freedom of contract did not 
include freedom of competition; monopoly and cartelization were not 
considered against the public interest. In the 1920's the Japanese 
government even gave positive encouragement to their formation 
through the Export Society Law and the Major Export Commodities 
Association Law. Cartels were barred during the occupation by the 
aforementioned Antimonopoly Law and though there were exceptions 
for antidepression and rationalization cartels, less than 30 have ever 
been formed. (These exceptions are not to be confused with those 
granted after 1949 and at the onset of the Cold War with the 
encouragement of U. S. policy.) Most cartels came into existence due to 
legislation written or amended to provide exceptions from the 
Antimonopoly Law at the onset of the Cold War. 
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In the light of the current textile war between the U. s. and Japan, it 
should be noted that the U'. S., in certain instances, promotes Japanese 
cartelization. This is largely a result of formal and informal agreements 
for quotas on certain goods exported to the U. S. The inevitable effect 
of a quota, however, whether it be voluntary or government imposed, is 
the formation of a cartel among exporters of the commodity. This is 
done in order to have some way of dividing the market. 
In conclusion, the text's greatest value is that of a reference book. On 
reading the conclusion of Parts I and II, one may get enough working 
knowledge of the work to use it for his particular purpose. 
B.W.H. 
